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SCANDAL AND DIALOGICAL NETWORK: WHAT DOES MORALITY DO TO 
POLITICS 
About the Islamic headscarf within the Egyptian parliament 
Baudouin Dupret, CNRS-ISP (Cachan) 
Enrique Klaus, CEDEJ (Cairo) 
Jean-Noël Ferrié, CNRS-PACTE (Grenoble) 
This chapter aims at analyzing the mechanisms specific to the birth, the swelling and the 
dying out of the particular public phenomenon of the scandal, as it can be observed within an 
Egyptian environment. In the ordinary world, other people are constantly the object of 
normative assessments. When brought to the public, these evaluations give them their 
reputation, when positive, or make them fear to be discredited, when negative. Generally, the 
media constitute the means through which judgements concerning reputation take the 
dimension of a scandal. Sometimes, the scandal is relayed in official settings like the 
Parliament. We recently examined how a particular dialogical site, e.g. the Egyptian People‟s 
Assembly, the lower chamber of the Egyptian Parliament, can be part of the broader 
dialogical network of the scandal ignited by the Minister‟s statement, what we called the 
“Fârûq Husnî case” (Klaus, Dupret, Ferrié 2008). It is now possible to analyse the sequential 
organization, the categorization devices, the protagonists and the audiences implicated in the 
enfolding of a news item of this type, which transformed into a scandal and even in a public 
cause. 
We proceed in three steps. First, we analyse the ordinary mechanisms of reputation and its 
breaches. We observe, in our material, how the structures of social and institutional life, like 
politeness, the protection of appearances, face preservation, but also their trial, like insults, 
humiliation and discredit, are achieved in action, through intertwined language games. 
Second, we describe how the mechanisms of ordinary reputation can be circumstantially 
mobilized to sustain, amplify and give credit to accusations, and therefore contribute to a 
generalization process giving to a singular blame the generic status of a scandal. Third, we 
scrutinize the functioning of a phenomenon which, although it does not exhaust the scope of 
all possible modes of the spreading out of scandals, constitutes a recurring and important 
figure: the moral over-investment of politics. We describe how questions related to moral 
relevance can be treated as such by members, but can also aim, without using explicit terms, 
at objectives belonging to the political repertoire. 
This affair has its starting point with the statement the Egyptian Minister of Culture Fârûq 
Husnî made to the newspaper al-Misrî al-Yawm on 16 November 2006, in which he presented 
the headscarf as a sign of regression of the Egyptian society. This statement provoked a 
controversy opposing protagonists coming from political, religious and artistic milieus. 
Shortly afterward, it entered the precinct of the People‟s Assembly which was starting its 
annual session. The parliamentary debate proved fierce. Within a couple of days, the press 
multiplied accounts of both the debate and diverse personalities‟ stakeouts. Without ever 
officially apologizing, the Minister proposed a conciliatory solution consisting in the creation 
of a religious commission at the Ministry of Culture. Little by little, the crisis dried up and, 
after mid-December, it was almost forgotten. 
Good Press, Bad Press: Reputation in the Context of the Media and the Parliament 
While potentially containing intimate elements of a biography, reputation nevertheless 
remains a thoroughly public phenomenon. Reputation is with regard to the tribunal of the 
opinion what investigation is to the judicial court of justice. It is a kind of presumption about 
somebody else‟s identity with regard to a virtual public. Identity, in an interactional 
perspective, is the outcome of ascriptions and claims of ontological qualities (“I am”, “you 
are”, “s/he is”), a game of being and seeming, a “face” game, which is the object of constant 
negotiations, the object of a “face-to-face”. Pragmatic linguistics was concerned with this 
issue in situations of co-presence. Brown and Levinson (1987) treated of it in their politeness 
model. In the turmoil of social relations, people strive to preserve their face; by so doing they 
threaten the other‟s face (face-threatening acts, FTA). They can also explicitly wish to affect 
him/her. Threatening, preserving and affecting are collaborative achievements. Brown and 
Levinson (1987: 69) summarize face-threatening strategies in the following chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
The chart describes a situation where something threatens somebody else‟s face. One can 
choose to act in an implicit way, with the benefit of not exposing oneself to the menace of 
discredit. One can also choose to act in an explicit way, in which case one might wish 
eventually to attenuate the consequences damaging for the other person or, on the contrary, 
not to care and to act in a blunt uncompromising way. If preserving someone else‟s face is at 
stake, one can also act so as to offer him/her a way out or not to make him risk ostracism. It 
seems to us that the Brown & Levinson model is excessively idealistic when omitting to 
consider situations where threatening someone else‟s face is a goal in itself, in which case one 
casts insults, in a more subtle manner, one adopts a façade politeness (stippled brackets in the 
chart). Such strategy aims at maximizing discredit while preserving self-esteem. Insults can 
indeed be more degrading for their formulator than for their addressee. 
Although the Brown & Levinson model applies to face-to-face situations, it should not be 
discarded in situations where participants in the exchange are not physically gathered. 
Conversation analysis considers talk exchanges within a conversation as many speech-turns 
which articulation to one another must be analysed in a sequential manner. The notion of 
speech-turns must be understood, in its most ordinary sense, as a statement formulated by one 
co-present participant responding to a preceding participant. The idea of a dialogical network 
(Nekvapil & Leudar 2002; Leudar & Nekvapil 2007; Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil 2004) 
consists in extending the speech-turn system beyond situations of co-presence to all mediated 
exchanges. In other terms, the many parties to the exchange must not be physically gathered. 
Hence, the notion of a dialogical network allows stressing the networking of occurrences 
(press conferences, stakeouts, interviews) distant in time and space, mediatized and connected 
among each other thematically, interactively and argumentatively. We observe, through the 
analysis of our data on the Fârûq Husnî affair, in the press and in the parliamentary records 
that the face-threatening and preserving mechanisms of the Brown & Levinson model remain 
effective in this type of network and can be applied to interactions separated in time and 
space. 
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With redressive action 
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Actually, the whole dialogical network of the affair we concentrate on is rapidly set against 
the moral background of the Minister of Culture‟s reputation. This background is made of 
biographical elements related either to his sexual intimacy or to the performance of his 
function. Even before the parliamentary session, the alleged homosexuality of the Minister 
can be read between the lines in the press, like in this statement by Hamdî Hasan: “The 
Minister‟s ideas and his many provocative behaviours are something that his Lord only will 
judge” (Nahdat Misr, 18 November). When suggesting Fârûq Husnî‟s indecency, his 
detractors open the possibility for inferential judgements stemming from the disjunctive 
categorial mechanism opposing a minister (whose perversity is “well known”) and the 
defenders of Islam (whose virtue are “above suspicion”). The rationale of the accusation 
shows how much it is not necessary to enter into the details of the reprobation object in order 
to allow the latter to express itself forcefully. Moreover, the allusive character of a 
categorization and the amplitude of the inferential repertoire it opens prove most efficient. It 
is even more damaging for the stigmatised person that inferences to be drawn against a moral 
background discretely sketched can grow up at the mercy of a random communicational 
dynamics. 
It is also the possibility that his reputation as a homosexual affects his ministerial function 
that we can observe at the initial stage of this affair. So, Hamdî Hasan, continuing his 
declaration to Nahdat Misr (18 November), adds: “That he decides to make the Ministry of 
Culture adopt these principles and viewpoints, through his call to respectful work dedicated to 
keeping an open mind, this is what we oppose vigorously”. In this statement, it is the 
categorial pair public-private which is mobilized to ground the Minister‟s illegitimacy to 
extend to his ministerial activity what belongs to his intimacy. This pair is embedded in an 
argumentative context aiming at separating the repertoires of action. In other argumentative 
contexts but in the same affair, it is exactly for converse purposes that the same pair can be 
invoked. This is the case, for instance, when the Minister is denied the right to make personal 
declarations for the reason that his responsibility as a public person cannot hide behind the 
personal character of some of his opinions. 
In a more interactive way, the Minister‟s reputation is invoked and exploited throughout 
the parliamentary debates. It follows the same inferential scheme, starting with the 
questioning of the private person and ending with the denunciation of his public 
responsibilities. In the following excerpt, Sa„d „Abbûd starts with the reminder of Fârûq 
Husnî‟s past declarations in which he explained his reticence vis-à-vis marriage: 
Excerpt 1: Parliamentary session, 20 November 2006 (verbatim) 
The Hon.  S.„A.„A.W. Qutb (Sa„d „Abbûd) 
494 Then, this way of behaving followed by this Minister has 
495 antecedents, when he was publicly asked on the 
496 television one day why he had marry nobody and he 
497 answered “He who wants a glass of milk buys a cow”. [These] 
498 are words uttered by the Minister before. I understand them and 
499 you understand them [as meaning that] he who wants to drink a 
500 glass of milk has only to buy a cow. These words were used 
501 before by this Minister‟s mouth […] 
Many times, e.g. during the TV episode referred to by the MP, the Minister‟s celibacy was 
cited as an incongruity asking for repair. Just focusing on this excerpt, we see how the reason 
for his celibacy he justifies with a kind of popular saying leaves open the range of possible 
interpretations and potential inferences concerning his sexual permissiveness. With a specific 
lexicon and the language games it authorizes, and through the use of an intertextual technique 
embedding the Minister‟s voice to better document the authority of the damaging inference, 
Sa„d „Abbûd builds a background nimbus grounding Fârûq Husnî‟s marginality. Assimilating 
the wife to the cow and formulating the opinion that in sexual matters one has to look for 
what fits one‟s appetite, establish an inferential moral substrate regarding sexual orientations 
(heterosexual licentiousness, bisexual licentiousness, homosexuality) of the intended person. 
Following up his intervention, the same speaker uses the description of the Minister‟s 
intimacy to affect his public activity: 
Excerpt 2: Parliamentary session, 20 November 2006 (verbatim) 
The Hon.  S.„A.„A.W. Qutb (Sa„d „Abbûd) 
501 […] by this Minister‟s mouth. Then 
502 the carrying out of these declarations is a blow to this  
503 deeply Islamic country on the Minister‟s behalf –  
504 fundamentally …*. I require that this minister resigns 
505 or that one fires this minister, for what he sometimes blurts out, not 
506 regarding what is related to the headscarf, but regarding what is related 
507 to his continuous and provocative declarations through which he takes up 
508 a way of behaving which contradicts our fait and our Law 
509 (sharî‘a). I repeat that this Minister‟s resignation is 
510 compulsory and necessary now. Thank you. 
* At the place of the dots, utterances which it was decided to suppress. 
As we stressed when addressing press discourse, the public-private distinction is used but 
this time to refute the tightness divide between the two pair parts. It clearly appears that the 
semantic dimension of categorizations cannot be understood outside the context of their 
usage, that is, outside their pragmatics. 
Blowing somebody else‟s face is an action which presents serious risks for those who 
perform it, since participants‟ faces are mutually and collaboratively vulnerable during the 
exchange (Brown & Levinson 1987). Besides its deleterious character, insulting expose its 
undertaker to a whole set of retaliatory measures stretching from recording this precedent in 
his moral profile to ostracism. This is how journalists stress, in the press account of the 
parliamentary session, beyond the unexpected concord between majority MPs and Islamist 
minority MPs, the breach made to the etiquette ruling parliamentary activities: “What is new 
is the NDP‟s position1 who slaughtered the Minister and offered [his remains] to the [Muslim] 
Brothers
2
 in their offending attack against him” (al-Misrî al-Yawm, 23 novembre). Numerous 
commentaries and analyses depict scenes of lynching and killing to better express the 
virulence of Fârûq Husnî‟s discredit: “The scene was scarry and frightening. They were all 
brandishing their unsheatered swords in the midst of crispation, outbursts of anger and uproar. 
It was like you could not hear but the cries: „Fârûq Husnî‟s head… Fârûq Husnî‟s head‟… 
And actually the NDP‟s MPs made fall the Minister‟s head and brought it on an iron trail… to 
the Brothers” (Rûz al-Yûsif, 22 Novembre). Or still: “And we decided to unwind on Fârûq 
Husnî, although it is known that he has clean hands and a fautless (nazâha) wealth, and that 
he was never, not even once, accused of corruption during his 20 years at the head of the 
Ministry of Culture. And this is not to defend Fârûq Husnî…” (al-Misrî al-Yawm, 22 
novembre). 
                                                 
1
 National Democratic Party, i.e. President Mubârak‟s ruling party, which used to have always a majority above 
two thirds of the two chambers‟ MPs. 
2
 Muslim Brothers constitute the principal opposition force within the Egyptian People‟s Assembly, although 
their political party is not legally recognized.  
It appears from these journalistic metaphors that, because of the argumentative constraint 
exerted on participants, critique cannot address the substance of the debate and must limit 
itself to its form. In other words, since it is utterly difficult for participants in the debate to 
retract on a series of topics concerning what is “Islamically correct” (what we called 
“negative solidarity” in Ferrié 2004), unanimity can only be by-passed through the critique of 
the violation of basic forms of civility and by compensating a blow made to one image by the 
show of another image to its advantage. There is a more fundamental dividing line which is 
drawn beyond the Minister of Culture‟s reputation, which opposes the partisans of a 
contrasted normativity, despite the fact that it cannot enfold in all its nuances within a 
parliamentary precinct characterized by procedural constraints and the negative-solidarity 
effects: “„The Minister of Sins as he is called by the Muslim Brotherhood, „the best Minister 
of Culture in Egypt‟s history‟ as he is described by leftist intellectuals, following the famous 
headscarf struggle. Here is the extreme contrast (tabâyun) between the Islamists‟ position and 
the leftist [personalities‟], which grossly summarizes the fight which the Minister triggered 
among them” (al-Ahrâr, 4 Decembre). 
From Discredit to Scandal 
The mechanisms of reputation are in action in the specific contexts of media and 
parliaments. However, blows made to reputation remain usually confined within singular 
occurrences. It means that discredit rarely gets generalized. It is only occasionally that the 
ordinary-reputation mechanisms are mobilized to amplify accusations and to attempt shifting 
from a singular blame to the status of an affair drawing on a “scandalous” event. Three 
questions deserve here special attention: First, we observe the use of words which, taken in 
context, share a family resemblance common to the language games of the scandal; Second, 
we analyse how this language game structure itself in the practical grammar of a scandal 
process; Third, we describe how, according to the satisfaction of some “felicity conditions”, a 
scandal process can be brought to a successful conclusion or, conversely and through various 
means, the generalization specific to this process can be impeded or inverted. 
The Fârûq Husnî affair is by far not systematically characterized as a scandal. Often, it is 
about a controversy or a struggle. However, the terms used to speak of it share – to use 
Wittgenstein‟s expression (1965 and 1967) a family resemblance, which make them belong to 
the language games pertaining to the scandal, that is (to give some minimalist definition of the 
word), to a process of publicly denouncing a blow to moral norms (cf. also de Blic & 
Lemieux 2005: 10). But even so, the practical grammar of words related to scandal is 
complex: there is no undifferentiated, indifferent to enunciation context, use of the word in its 
substantive (a scandal), predicative (a scandalous affair), verbal (to make a scandal), or 
adverbial (in a scandalous way) form. The words related to scandal have a major importance: 
on the one hand, an implicit and ordinary definition of the notion emerges from the family 
resemblance they share and the language games they allow; on the other hand, they function 
in a largely performative way: the use of these words create the blow to the norm as much as 
they reflect it. In the Fârûq Husnî affair, the very quick characterization of the events as the 
“struggle for the veil” (see excerpt 5, line 1) and their insertion in the newspapers front-page 
achieve the dramatization of the facts and their tying-up to the scandal family, together with 
demands, relayed by the press, for the Minister‟s excuses and sacking: 
Excerpt 3: al-Misrî al-yawm, front-page, 18 Novembre 2006 
1. The Struggle (ma‘raka) Of the Veil Between Fârûq Husnî, the Brothers and the Sheikhs 
2. [Facsimile of the first article, caption:] Picture of al-Misrî al-yawm‟s yesterday scoop article 
3. Yesterday, the struggle of the veil broke out between, on one side, Fârûq Husnî, Minister of Culture, and, on 
4. the other side, the sheikhs and the Muslim Brotherhood. Declarations made the day before by the Minister to 
5. al-Misrî al-Yawm on the topic of his rejection of the veil provoked various reactions. International press 
6. agencies reported, from [what he said to] al-Misrî al-Yawm, the Minister‟s declarations, which provoked a 
7. broad polemic on Islamic-oriented websites. Muslim Brothers launched a vast and forceful attack 
8. against the Minister. Husayn Ibrâhîm, the deputy president of the Brotherhood group at the People‟s 
9. Assembly, presented a memorandum to the Parliament, demanding from the President of the Republic the 
10. Minister‟s sacking (‘uzl). At the same time, Dr Hamdî Hasan, the group‟s official spokesman, presented a 
11. request for urgent communication (bayân ‘âjil) to the Prime Minister, in which he asks for the Minister‟s 
12. excuses (i‘tizâr) and his sacking (iqâla). In parallel, intellectuals expressed their support to the Minister‟s 
13. opinion. They consider the veil as a Wahhabi phenomenon, [which] they describe as a seed planted by Sadat 
14. during the 1970s to achieve political goals. They claim that this is a “wahhabization” of the Egyptian culture.  
15. […] 
A categorization conflict follows between the Minister‟s defenders and denunciators, or 
even among the defenders themselves. We have already stressed that the use of categories 
“allows members of a social group to produce inferences, judgements and justifiable 
ascriptions” (Dupret 2006: 399) concerning the social identity of things, people and actions 
(see also above). Knowledge is largely structured by categorizations, often organized in a 
paired way, to which types of activities, rights and duties are bound. In that sense, the choice 
of categorical descriptors has important consequences and is therefore the object of important 
conflicts. These conflicts often concern categorial pairs offering a morally consequential 
alternative to “categorizers”. Thus, characterizing the veil as a “Wahhabi phenomenon3” 
(excerpt 5, line 13) or as a “dress code” (Hamdî Hasan‟s statement in Nahdat Misr, front-page 
article, 18 November 2006) triggers immediately heavy consequences as to the identity of the 
person who chose one category or another (intellectuals vs. Muslim Brothers), to actions and 
commitments which can be expected from him (supporting the Minister vs. bluntly attacking 
him), to the right to take sides in the debate (illegitimate secularism vs. legitimate “state 
islamism”), to those on behalf of whom one claims to speak (non-representative minority vs. 
silent majority). 
The words of scandal share, beyond their organization in categorial pairs, to concern a 
moral norm and to denounce the breach made to it (or the denegation of this breach). This is 
why they present some family resemblance: they relate to an act of designating a normative 
contradiction which gives reasons to be scandalized (de Blic & Lemieux 2005: 20). So, in this 
case, the Minister‟s declarations are denounced as a “permissive backwardness”, 
“irresponsible”, contrary to the values of a “pious people”, at war against “Islamic values”, 
“rejectionist”, “perverse”, contrary to “the Constitution and the sharî‘a”, immoral, opposed to 
“the State‟s official religion” (al-Misrî al-Yawm, front-page article, 18 November 2006), 
indifferent to “the sources of legislation in Islam” (Nahdat Misr, front-page article, 18 
November 2006), inflammatory (al-Karâma, 21 November), accommodating toward the West 
(Nahdat Misr, 21 November), or even the emanation of a “fifth column” (Nahdat Misr, 3 
December). 
The words of the scandal articulate in a language game which is specific to the 
denunciation of the public blow made to the moral norm. This game is sensitive to context 
and, in this sense it varies from one culture to another. De Blic and Lemieux (2005: 29) speak 
in that respect of a “set of shared and evolutionary expectations related to procedures to 
respect in order to denounce, judge and sanction in public”. It means that language games are 
multiple and reflect forms of life which are culturally and praxiologically diverse, that is, they 
refer to communities of shared language and practices (Schulte 1992: 124-125). It is possible 
to describe the practical grammar and the usage conditions of these language games, i.e. “how 
                                                 
3
 This is the predicate used to refer to Saudi Arabia‟s conservative Islam. 
language, action and enunciation circumstances articulate to each other” (Schulte 1992: 118). 
Quoting Jeff Coulter (1989: 49): “Grammars reveal the manifold connections between kinds 
of expression and the sorts of circumstance within which and about which they may be used”. 
Establishing the practical grammar of the scandal leads thus to the description of the 
sequential organization of the different elements of a “scandal process”. As the expression 
indicates, this process has a necessarily public dimension: it takes place in public and it 
addresses a public audience. It starts with the designation of a moral contradiction which is 
given some publicity by denunciating the violation of a shared norm and giving the reasons to 
be scandalized. This denunciation orients to an audience, although virtual, which it 
contributes to reflexively configure. Besides, by making visible the moral contradiction it 
supposes, the scandal process invites to the sanction (always public) of the culprit. However, 
it does not mechanically produce the repair to the moral breach it supposes: facts 
characterization can be contested and the object of the scandal can resist. Moreover, in its 
sequential logic, the scandal process can go through high and low tides, but it always runs into 
a close, either active (the sanction) or by default (the non-suit). Whatever the outcome, this 
process always concerns the identification and assessment of a collectivity‟s moral norms, 
therefore participating in their formation and transformation. 
In this grammar of the scandal process, Garfinkel‟s article on degradation ceremonies 
(1956: 420-424) facilitates the analysis of morality-cognition mechanisms which are 
operating. Garfinkel defines status degradation as “any communicative work between 
persons, whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into something looked on as 
lower in the local scheme of social types” (id.: 420). It is a work of disqualification and re-
qualification, the criteria of which are the motivations scheme that is socially ascribed to the 
denounced person to explicate his action. The public denunciation, which triggers the 
denounced person‟s degradation, aims at destroying a social object in order to build another. 
Denunciation rhetoric often combines irony and the biographical re-examination of the 
denounced person. It also present a number of features: (1) the event and the denounced 
person seem to be out of the ordinary; (2) the blamed thing and the denounced person are 
placed within a scheme of preferences between general types which are assessed by referring 
to a dialectical counterpart; (3) the denunciator behaves so that he appears as a public figure 
acting as such; (4) the denunciator makes salient the supra-personal values of the “tribe” and 
achieves the denunciation in the name of these values; (5) the denunciator presents himself as 
invested of the right to speak in the name of these ultimate values; (6) the denunciator is 
perceived by witnesses as a supporter of these values; (7) the denunciator and the witnesses 
fix and perceive the distance that separates them from the denounced person; (8) the 
denounced person is ritually separated from the place he occupies in the legitimate order. 
All these features are most explicitly found in the Fârûq Husnî affair: (1) the denounced 
person is a Minister whose profile is marked and atypical, whose political longevity is 
outstanding, and whose public stakeouts are original and non-consensual; the wearing of the 
veil belongs to sensitive issues in today‟s Egypt, it is the object of recurring attritions, and 
challenging its religious-obligation dimension constitutes an exception to the ordinary 
mechanism of negative solidarity; (2) it is indeed an event of a general type – the breach to 
the principles of the “True Religion” – which the denunciators make public; it is not only 
Fârûq Husnî who is under attack, but beyond his person, all this trend which is accused of 
despising religion and aping the West, even in its depraved values; the denounced event and 
person are not singularities, but the expression of a generic though minority trend; they are 
systematically placed as a dialectical counterpart of virtuous principles and models; in other 
words, the features of the scandal object can be read as symmetrically opposite to the honest 
citizen‟s; the Egyptian citizen is not given alternatives within a range of moral possibilities, 
but is compelled to make the choice of the veil if he wants to warrant his respectability; (3) 
denunciators always present themselves as public figures acting in their quality and not as 
individuals, as the statutory guardians of morality and not as people acting for personal 
reasons (i.e. as a sheikh, a MP, a Muslim Brother, a citizen, an upright journalist, a woman, an 
intellectual, moral, or religious authority, etc.); (4) denunciators keep on foregrounding the 
values common to Egyptians, among which prominently piety; Fârûq Husnî‟s declaration is 
denounced in the name of the virtue of al-Azhar‟s country4; (5) when claiming their own 
virtue and their institutional quality, denunciators constantly stress their right to denounce; 
they even make it a duty, that is, an obligation proceeding from the status they occupy; (6) 
journalists, when not themselves denunciators, act as witnesses to the fact that the 
denunciation finds its roots in these values which the denunciators are defending; (7) through 
the production of a distance between “them” (those who, like Fârûq Husnî, are deviant) and 
“us” (the virtuous people of Egypt and its representatives), denunciators draw a dividing line 
the crossing of which looks impossible; (8) Fârûq Husnî is constantly presented as unworthy 
of his charge, all the more because culture is a fixation around which the debate on “re-
islamization” is largely crystallizing; this de facto indignity implies demanding his de jure 
resignation; the denunciation aims at stressing the distance which currently makes it 
impossible that the Minister keeps his position in the legitimate order. 
The transgression which is denounced in the scandal process goes hand in hand with the 
call for the perpetrator‟s sanction and degradation. In the press, it can take the following 
shape: “The Brothers demand the President of the Republic to fire Fârûq Husnî” (al-Misrî al-
Yawm, front-page article, 18 November 2006). Within the People‟s Assembly, the conclusion 
of an „Independant‟ MP‟s speech-turn constitutes another good example: “It‟s necessary that 
this Minister resigns and if the government shows self-respect, it should fire the Minister of 
Culture” (excerpt 6, lines 343-344). The demand for sanctions does lead to a successful 
conclusion in an automatic manner. The transgressed-norm characterization does not proceed 
in a linear way, but is the object, as we already saw, of contestations and attritions. Moreover, 
the scandal can, after having been made public, inflate or stagnate, according to the 
satisfaction of the denunciation felicity conditions. It is not so much about whether the 
denunciation is unanimous, but the denunciators‟ capacity to elevate the denounced thing and 
person to the rank of a social stake, to make it transform from a singular situation to a general 
case which can eventually get the status of a public cause. We shall be back to this issue, but 
it is for now enough to stress the contrasted nature of stakeouts in the 21 November edition of 
Nahdat Misr or the amplification effect of the first parliamentary debate of  20
th
 November 
(and its retake on the 22
nd
). In other words, it is the dynamics specific to the dialogical 
network of the affair which explains its evolution. As for its close, it works in our case 
through the transition from confrontation to negotiation. People speak of “defusing the crisis” 
and looking for “intermediary solutions” (Nahdat Misr, 25 November), of “reconciliation 
operation” (Akhbâr al-Yawm, 25 November), of “a dialogue characterized by frankness and 
openness” (al-Watan al-Yawm, 28 November). Let us notice that the moral norm in the 
transgression of which the scandal originates comes out strengthened from the process: the 
transaction does not concern its existence or its obligatory status, but the right of a Minister to 
take personal positions and to have on the norm a discourse at the margins of the consensus 
some morality entrepreneurs would like to promote. Nahdat Misr speaks of a Minister who 
“thinks about the formula proposed by Shihâb in the form of excuses for the evil that was 
cause by the [bad] interpretation of what he [said]” (3 December); and of a crisis which 
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“ended without excuses”, when the Muslim Brothers said they were satisfied with “the 
Minister [expressing] his respect toward veiled women” (4 December). 
The scandal process may not produce the effects which were expected by its instigators. 
This is linked to the choice of the moral norm the breach of which is denounced. In order for 
the process to succeed, such norm must indeed be presented in a credible way as shared, even 
by those who do not adhere to it. In other words, it must be norm propitious to the mechanism 
of negative solidarity Jean-Noël Ferrié (2004: 122) defines as “the adoption of a common 
behaviour [which] does not proceed from the unanimous choice of everybody, but from the 
difficulty for anybody to express his disagreement”. Such is the case in the Fârûq Husnî 
affair, in the sense that all the protagonists of the parliamentary debate – to confine ourselves 
to that setting – converge on the primacy of the religious reference (“Islamic religion is the 
religion of all civilisations. And progress doesn‟t mean to depart from the principles of Islam. 
Actually, progress means to remain bound to Islamic principles”) and on the infraction 
perpetrated by the Minister (“I adjure President Mubârak to come to the rescue of Egypt‟s 
people and to fire the deviant Minister …* who departed from what Islam requires, who 
departed from the Egyptian people‟s consensus”). Many participants posit the norm which is 
the object of the debate on the register of what is intangible (“The issue of the veil is not open 
to examination. It‟s a question which is settled for 1,400 years. It isn‟t today that we‟ll 
examine the veil issue. The veil issue isn‟t challengeable; it‟s an issue which is closed”). 
Obviously, this intangibility and the negative solidarity it creates are no matters of fact, but an 
achievement, the outcome of an argumentative endeavour of normalisation which 
progressively shrinks the space allowed for nuance and forces the expression of a façade 
consensus. Many excerpts of the parliamentary debate could be used to illustrate how any 
deviance vis-à-vis the axiological norm promoted by the denouncers is sanctioned by an 
interruption which places the speaker on the defensive and compels him to progressively get 
in line with the position of those who interrupt him. In a dynamics of successive sanctions 
imposing step by step the shrinking of the range of options open to the speaker, denouncers 
succeed in having the latter restrict himself to the minimum consensual, the content of which 
fitting the moral axiology promoted by the entrepreneurs of the scandal process because he 
had to step back in order to save his face. 
The scandal process can also come to an end without the suggested sanction being 
implemented. The fact that Fârûq Husnî neither resigned nor was sacked does not mean in any 
way that the scandal process he went through failed. As Beaumarchais‟ quote goes, “if you 
speak ill of somebody, there will always remain something”. Indeed, some effects of the 
scandal process related to the wearing of the veil will be perceptible later on; the scandal will 
be the object of retakes, in the same way it itself leant on the retake of former affairs which 
can be traced back at different points of the dialogical network enfolding. It is as much from 
the accumulation of processes of this type as from the violence or the acuity of one of them 
that some effect can proceed, be it expected originally or not. In Jon Elster‟s terms, one can 
speak of the indirect effects of actions undertaken for other purposes (Elster 1987). It is not 
sure that the entrepreneurs of the scandal process against Fârûq Husnî had really considered 
the possibility of his sacking. It appears that the sanction which is demanded by the 
denouncers does not necessarily constitute the goal of the scandal process they triggered or 
fed. The call for sanction is part of the grammar of the “scandalization”, the end of which, in 
any case contingent and contextual, proceeds from a will of political participation that must 
be accounted for. 
The moral over-investment of politics 
Although the political dimension of its trigger element is not initially obvious, the Fârûq 
Husnî dialogical network proves thoroughly political. The political tone goes through the 
whole network and it is mainly the participants in the network who give it this political 
dimension, in their quality of politicians for some of them, as aforementioned, but also 
through the mobilisation of this repertoire when intervening in Parliament and in the press. 
The political repertoire indexing can noticeably be seen in the institutional inferences the 
participants in the debate mobilize. So, the latter call upon the government‟s responsibility 
and demand it collectively takes position: “Now, a Muslim Minister of the Egyptian 
government comes and attacks the veil. He must withdraw from the opinion he formulated. 
There must be a statement of the government and the Party against the Minister”. It is in his 
quality of representative of the government within the parliamentary precinct that Mufîd 
Shihâb expresses himself about the affair: “In any case, I‟ve to hurry and announce the 
[opinion] of the government, which makes me the honour to depute me to speak on his behalf. 
And I tell [you] that, on no account, the government shall accept the breach to the precepts of 
Islamic religion”. As for the press, it does not omit to stress that the Prime Minister was late 
in taking position, as if it had to better mean that an official reaction was expected on an issue 
which had become politically consequential: “The Prime Minister, Dr Ahmad Nazîf, 
criticized the violent attack to which the artist Minister Fârûq Husnî was exposed. He 
repeated – two weeks after the veil affair broke out, in the calm after the storm of attacks 
against Husnî – that public personalities may give personal opinions in questions which do 
not pertain to their work” (al-Misrî al-Yawm, 30 November). 
It is mainly via institutional inferences that participants can speak of a crisis and of lack of 
balance between the legislative and executive powers. So, when Fârûq Husnî‟s absence is 
noticed at the time of the parliamentary debate, it is the whole institutional system which is 
questioned and specifically the Assembly‟s right to control the government‟s activities: “I had 
hoped that a Minister who‟s responsible in our government presents himself before the 
Assembly and its members”. The same critique is found in the opposition press: “The 
People‟s Assembly was effectively exerting its original competence (ikhtisâsuhu al-asîl) 
when interrogating the ministers. If ministers cannot be interrogated (musâ’ala) anymore, it 
would reflect the decline (ihdâr) of one of the most important means of the People‟s 
Assembly and the MPs‟ loss of their right [to exert their prerogatives]” (al-Jamâhîr, 29 
novembre). 
Because the protagonists and the contexts are characterized in political terms, the stakes of 
the affair are presented as specifically political. This is why we can observe the participants 
concurring to impose their definition of these stakes, starting with the question of the official 
or unofficial character of the Minister‟s declarations. For some people, the blamed 
declarations have ab initio a political dimension and reflect a more general trend of the 
government vis-à-vis Islam: “This is not a Minister‟s [stance], but we know this is the State‟s 
[stance] against the veil and against Islam‟s principles”. For other people, it is a question of 
preserving appearances and not compromising the regime: “The National Party expresses its 
opinion and condemns these declarations”. Originally, the characterization of the declaration 
as personal corresponded to the Minister‟s attempt at taming the damaging consequences of 
his statements being made public. In the same attempt at deflating the affair, NDP big shots 
tried to sort out issues according to their political importance and to relegate the “struggle of 
the veil” to the background: “This is why I ask the Honourable President and the honourable 
brothers and sisters members of the People‟s Assembly not to give this topic more importance 
than it deserves. Because we have questions of an extreme importance”. In this context, 
President Mubârak‟s announcement of constitutional amendments was evoked by the Minister 
for Parliamentary Affairs: “How painful it is for me [to see] that our first working session 
[takes place] in this extreme tension. This, after we heard yesterday the important talk of 
Mister the President of the Republic. We‟re accomplishing a serious and critical work 
concerning the constitutional amendments and the laws”. Others worry about the negative 
consequences of the Fârûq Husnî affair on the political agenda: “Some ministers warned 
against the fact that, if we don‟t contain the crisis rapidly, it‟ll lead to a critical deterioration 
of the government‟s position vis-à-vis public opinion, and the Brothers will get in 
considerable gain at a critical time before discussing constitutional amendments” (Nahdat 
Misr, 19 November). 
Finally, among the political stakes of the affair as defined by the commentators, one finds 
numerous interpretations re-actualizing the issue of the Muslim Brothers‟ call for the building 
of an Islamic State: “What would happen if they [viz. the Brothers] did govern? Would the 
fate of those who formulate an opinion be to go to the scaffold?” (Rûz al-Yûsif, 24 
November); “They revealed, as the Brotherhood, a tyrannical [nature] endowed with a 
totalitarian ideology, which does not bear diverging opinions [...] If they did all this in the veil 
affair, what will they make of us if they accede to power?!” (Nahdat Misr, 19 November); “It 
is not about the veil affair, it is about the future of the civilian State, of civilisation, of history, 
of the acceptation of the other, of the necessity for Egypt, in the course of life, to remain 
itself” (Nahdat Misr, 22 November). 
We see through these statements that the specific dispute which started with Fârûq Husnî‟s 
declaration amplified and eventually became something like the “Fârûq Husnî affair”. 
Egyptian public life frequently witnesses this type of incidents. In the judicial context, we 
analysed many similar situations where a banal event crystallizes and gets publicly notorious 
(Dupret & Ferrié 1997). In this sense, an affair means the taking by a singular and ordinary 
fact of a public and media-geared dimension. In turn, the affair takes a particular shape when, 
transcending the singular and personal dimension of the case, it is mobilized to sustain a cause 
of general concern. 
Elisabeth Claverie (1994) shows how, in the Calas affair, Voltaire did not confer 
importance to Calas per se, but to the cause which he made him incarnate, i.e. the cause of 
humanity. The cause is thus the mobilization of general concern, above and outside particular 
interests, for the sake of “public good”. It is a procedure taking pretext of a singular question 
projected into the public space to serve supporting the claim and defence of a certain 
conception of society‟s general ordering. Through a work of “denunciatory displaying” or 
“critical exhibiting” (Claverie 1994: 85), “entrepreneurs of morality” seek to inflect the 
substantial definition of the public, while using different institutional resources which are 
available to them and staying formally within the scope of sense and reference authorized by 
the authorities. In a certain way, the cause is thus the projection of a conception of society, 
public good and general interest, around which one seeks to proceed to a moral and normative 
mobilization. As for the affair, it is the starting point of a generalizing process and the 
opportunity of a generic positioning. 
The dialogical network of the Fârûq Husnî affair is scattered with speech turns exhibiting 
its use for the purposes of a public cause, i.e. the cause of Islam and of its status within 
Egyptian State and society. During the parliamentary debate, Egypt‟s Islamic quality is 
constantly put forward: “Yes, we‟re an Islamic State. Yes, our Constitution stipulates that 
sharî‘a is the principal source of legislation. Yes, we‟re all Muslims. Yes, we all value 
Islamic religion, Islamic predication (da‘wâ), and Islam‟s principles. For all of us, our 
relationship to God – be He praised and exalted! – is the relationship of any zealous Muslim 
individual to his religion”; “We‟re in favour of Islamic sharî‘a, of our veil, of the respectable 
people who represent us everywhere”. In these excerpts, Egypt‟s Islamic character is not laid 
down in terms of confession or religious belonging stricto sensu. It is presented as a 
positioning or a commitment performatively taken when formulating these assertions. 
During the parliamentary debate still, Egypt‟s Islamic character is equally presented in 
opposition to a non-Islamic otherness or externality: “Sharî‘a stipulates it, Islam stipulates it, 
and all Islamic countries confirm [the necessity] of the veil. Must I do myself as Europe or 
France which forbad the veil?!”; “What is attributed to the Minister is therefore external to al-
Azhar‟s Egypt, to Islamic Egypt, to the Islamic world”. As soon as this virtuous islamicity is 
put forward, the cause of the defence of Islam steps in as a category-bound activity. The fact 
that defending Islam unfolds within the precinct of the People‟s Assembly has direct 
consequences on the way it is defended. MPs calling for Islam‟s defence orient to the rules of 
the institutional game: “I adjure President Mubârak to come to the rescue of Egypt‟s people 
and to fire the deviant Minister …* who departed from what Islam requires, who departed 
from the Egyptian people‟s consensus”; “I urge the State‟s President to be the President of the 
Islamic State, that is, a Muslim President in al-Azhar‟s land, as well as I ask him to fire this 
Minister”. 
It was all the more necessary to elevate this singular dispute to the status of a cause that, 
symmetrically, the adverse camp (i.e. the camp that did not lean on this particular case to 
defend Islam) saw in the Islamic generalizing process the ground of a counter-cause. 
Although it would be wrong to oppose the Parliament to the press in this case, it is mainly, 
because of the pragmatic aligning of positions in the former and because of the argumentative 
constraint exerted on its members, in the column of the latter that one can track the 
formulation of the counter-cause: “It is not the affair of the veil, it is this of tolerance” (al-
Misrî al-Yawm, 24 November); “It is not the affair of the veil, it is this of political Islam in 
Egypt” (id.); “From niqâb5 to veil, via the call for the Ministers‟ killing and firing… this is 
the struggle of Islam‟s guardians in Egypt, and they are even more numerous, day after day, 
they raise their voice and prepare for their fight in the long term” (Nahdat Misr, 19 
November). For the proponents of these counter-readings of the affair, the veil issue was 
perceived as a prerequisite, a first step before the advent of a political system wholly 
dominated by the Islamic reference. So, we see that, beyond the issue of the chastity of the 
female dress, moral stakes eventually become political. 
Considering the explicit character of this affair, we find here another confirmation that 
participating in politics means striving for the definition of norms (Dupret & Ferrié 1997). 
One of the means which are used to participate in power consists of appropriating a pre-
existing normative form, to substantiate it and thus to instate rules fixing normalcy and 
deviance. According to Howard Becker, this morality enterprise is grounded on three 
constitutive elements: initiative, publicity and interest. “Firstly, there must be somebody 
taking the initiative to make punish the supposed culprit; to implement a norm supposes thus 
a spirit of enterprise and implies an entrepreneur. Secondly, these who wish the norm to be 
implemented must draw the attention of others on the infraction; when made public, the latter 
cannot be neglected. In other words, there must be somebody shouting theft. Thirdly, in order 
to shout theft, there must be an advantage: it is personal interest which pushes to take this 
initiative” (Becker 1963: 145-146). In this context, the invention of the Islamic normative 
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tradition is embedded in a double move of power exercise and normative claim which, if 
analytically distinct, remains nevertheless phenomenologically indissociable: 
Excerpt 8: Parliamentary session, 20 November 2006 (verbatim) 
The Hon. K.H.M. Hasan (Karam al-Hifyân) 
721 […] What Mister the Minister of Culture 
722 declared constitutes a  
723 flagrant attack against sharî‘a and against the Constitution and 
724 it constitutes a deviance from Islam and Islamic principles. 
725 The legal rule (fiqhiyya) stipulates that there‟s no 
726 interpretation of a clear text. As soon as the text has a 
727 clear affiliation, one can‟t interpret it, either through 
728 a personal opinion or a non-personal opinion. 
729 The question of the veil belongs to the Islamic 
730 principles which were stipulated in the Koran, the established Tradition 
731 and the consensus of jurists (fuqahâ’) and imams. This is 
732 why I consider it a great honour for Mister  
733 the leader and the chief Muhammad Husnî Mubârak, for the majority‟s 
734 MPs and for the National Party to condemn 
735 (nusammim) and to ask for the resignation of the Minister of 
736 Culture. It‟ll strengthen the trust in the Egyptian 
737 legislature, the government and the National Party 
738 majority. 
Prefacing his turn, the speaker characterizes the Minister‟s deviance regarding Islam, its 
principles and the Egyptian constitution which refers to them. Then, in one and the same 
token, the MP actualizes the authority of the norm and its substantiation by relating the veil to 
four normative bodies, i.e. the legal rule, the Koran and the principles it stipulates, the 
Prophet‟s Tradition, and the consensus among jurists and imams on this issue. In the same 
excerpt, one finds the three features identified by Becker in his definition of morality 
enterprise: publicity, through the debate which took place in the Parliament and in which the 
MP participated; the initiative to “to condemn and to ask for the resignation of the Minister” 
(lines 734-735); and the interest, both honorific (“a great honour” – line 732) and political, 
since, according to the speaker, achieving this initiative will “strengthen the trust in the 
Egyptian legislature, the government and the National Party majority” – lines 736-738). One 
can also notice the specifically political character of the interest to get from this morality 
enterprise. In this case, we stress the MP‟s granting of the morality-enterprise retribution to 
different instances of the ruling authorities: the President of the Republic (though silent in this 
affair), the MPs of the majority and the ruling Party. The same double claim of power 
exercise and norm ediction can be found in the speech of the Minister for Parliamentary 
Affairs: “At every step, in each of its legislations and decisions, the government sticks 
(multazima) to the precepts of our religion, considering that sharî‘a, according to Article 2 of 
the Constitution, is the main source of legislation. All respect and all consideration (ijlâl) [are 
due] to the precepts of the Islamic religion, the main source of our legislation”. Submitting to 
the norm appears as a governmental principle, a commitment (which is one of the possible 
translations of the term multazima) and an institutional constraint (according to Art.2 of the 
Constitution). 
When the norm of reference is imposed, it becomes often impossible to contest its 
primacy, because of the mechanism of negative solidarity we already explained. Contrary to 
classical sociology which relates the plurality of values to the plurality of groups, we contend 
that we should better insist on the idea of persons embedded within the same space of 
references and playing, simultaneously, alternatively or concurrently, with values they share 
in common (Boltanski 1990: 81). Such lack of concurrence about norms of reference 
frequently initiates concurrence effects about the substantiation of norms and thus on their 
implementation. It is exactly in these terms that the press reacts, the day after the 
parliamentary session dealing with the Fârûq Husnî affair. Whereas NDP and Muslim 
Brothers MPs are known as political opponents, their will to fall into line with a virtual public 
opinion goes through moral overbidding: “History has nothing to do with Fârûq Husnî‟s 
opinion – and we disagree with him on this issue – but it concerns the phenomenon of ruling 
politics which bends over all storms and raises religious slogans” (Nahdat Misr, 21 
November). Ruling party‟s MPs come to circumstantially espouse opposition‟s themes in 
order to secure their individual popularity (nevertheless necessary in the Egyptian electoral 
system) and to allow the party to which they belong escaping the disgrace ignited by one, 
important though marginal, of its members‟ declarations. Moreover, one should not totally 
ignore personal resentment of MPs, albeit from the NDP, vis-à-vis a Minister whose stances 
do not belong to the normalcy we formerly alluded to. 
Although the scandal is triggered for itself, that is, in reaction to something considered as 
outrageous, it has the capacity to transform into a resource for political action, moral 
normativity being given the status of a major political stake. In a relatively closed system like 
in Egypt where there is no pluralism sorting out explicit political antagonisms, the many 
members share both rhetoric and values and struggle for the monopoly of their promulgation 
and implementation. Therefore, there is no concurrence on the conception of normativity, but 
on its performing
6
. As we already wrote about the Abu Zayd affair (Dupret & Ferrié, 1997), 
the people who desire to participate in power must posit themselves in a controlled political 
locus, seek to profit from and exploit some potentialities by maximizing the opportunities it 
offers. This is what we mean by the moral over-investment of politics. 
In the whole range of political action, there is one specific form (over)investing the 
repertoire of morality. Often, this form of action operates through the scandal. The detailed 
analysis of the Fârûq Husnî affair shows how, in Egypt, the moral repertoire can be largely 
invested by political actors who seek, by so doing, to bypass the fencing of public life. At the 
institutional level, this fencing is instantiated by the rulers‟ capacity to dodge any sanction of 
their action and management of public affairs, e.g. by cheating the polls. This fencing is 
observable in the fact that Egyptian political life finds its way within a double constraint: 
some channels which are explicitly political (like the alternation of rulers) are clogged; other 
channels are hardly practicable and are expensive for those who, individually or collectively, 
take them. 
Because of these constraints and fencing, morality, which is already heavily invested in all 
political regimes, becomes particularly solicited. Its accessibility, its relative efficacy, and its 
cheaper cost belong to the explicative factors of this preponderance. Its accessibility is even 
stronger because of the domination of one reference, i.e. Islam, the political protagonists of 
which are constantly disputing the monopoly. As for the efficacy of the moral repertoire and 
henceforth its cheaper political cost, it proceeds from both the centrality of the reference to 
Islam in Egyptian public life and the specific tendency of morality to take the shape of Islamic 
normativity. Mobilizing the repertoire of Islamic normativity allows he who uses it to be 
assimilated with the “good” part of the contrastive and antithetical pair moral-immoral, 
relegating his detractors to the categorial otherness of moral deviance. Let us remind in that 
respect that it is the proper of any statutory degradation ceremony and thus of any political 
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action using the repertoire of morality to make salient the group‟s supra-personal values, to 
initiate the denunciation in the name of these values, to ascribe oneself the status of proponent 
and defender of these values, and to claim to be invested of the legitimate right to talk in their 
name. 
At least three figures of the moral investment of politics are observable in the Fârûq Husnî 
affair and testify to the equivocal character of the relations between politics and morals. The 
first figure is the moralization of politics, by which we mean these situations where some 
protagonists benefit from their position within the political game to denounce what they 
consider to be outrageous. In this case, although it is difficult or even impossible to document 
the participants‟ sincerity (which does not mean either that one should doubt this sincerity a 
priori), the moral norm is exploited in itself and for itself, in order to secure its respect. In 
other words, politics is used to promote morality. In the two other figures, the equation is 
inverted: morality is used to better invest the field of politics and the moral repertoire 
becomes a repertoire of political action. These two inverted figures must be related to the 
fencing of public life as to the complicated use of some specifically political channels. It 
corresponds either to a cautious dodging of politics or to its re-characterization in non-directly 
oppositional terms. In the first case, one seeks to spare the cost of a direct political action. It is 
in that direction that heads the editor in chief of an opposition newspaper when noting that “it 
is easy to grip the government when entangled in a vice scandal, but harder to grip it in a 
corruption scandal” (al-Fajr, 27 November). The second case corresponds to these situations 
in which one seeks the full retributive and electoral profit of the use of the moral repertoire in 
politics. This is the meaning of one political commentator‟s remarks: “How to explain the 
NDP MPs‟ position? […] I do not think that the NDP has a religious stance in that respect. 
Then, does the NDP MPs‟ revolution express personal positions regarding a personal opinion 
or does it [constitute] some political exaggerating of the kind which allows to become popular 
in the street? Answer: Generally, such is the position of NDP MPs. But how to explain this 
coordination which clearly appeared in the room of the People‟s Assembly among NDP MPs? 
This, it cannot be explained. Maybe does it proceed from the will of some people to make 
Fârûq Husnî fall and to use him as a scapegoat. Politics, as everybody knows, has no morals” 
(al-Misrî al-Yawm, 23 November). However, the two latter figures cannot be considered 
separately from the former in the enfolding of a scandal. The equivocal character of morals in 
politics stems from this. 
The moral investment of politics is not the simple political use of morals. To say that the 
use of morals is part of strategies which can be documented, either in the parliamentary 
precinct or beyond, in the dialogical network the Minister of Culture‟s declarations ignited, 
does not mean that morals is just a means. It cannot be deduced from the opponents‟ 
investment in the building of a scandal that they use it in a simply manipulative way. 
Actually, the use of strategic resources does not implicate that the cause for which one uses 
them is itself a resource for other purposes. Parliamentary life and, more broadly, political life 
are so ordered that the game is played in a certain way and with certain resources. As stressed 
by Riker (1986), political life is an art of manipulation, but this is only a technical feature and 
not a cynical assessment of the manipulating people‟s beliefs and goals. It is possible to be a 
manipulator and to believe; to methodically and strategically proceed to establishing a fact 
and conducting a demonstration and to be nevertheless committed vis-à-vis this fact and the 
object of the demonstration, according to a conviction and not to an interest. The same holds 
true with strategy. To put it in a nutshell, means which are used for a political cause do not 
constitute a cause transformed into a political means. Besides, public interventions of MPs 
elected on a program of Islamic normativity conform so well to this program that it seems 
unnecessary to ascribe this conformity any cause but the program itself. Of course, some 
people among the promoters of the scandal may just consider it as a political means serving 
political interests. It would be the case of members of the majority wishing to “go popular”. 
However, opportunist people are, by nature, secondary people and not promoters. Moreover, 
although they do not believe themselves in the values they defend, they believe that others 
believe in them and, in that sense, they believe in the efficacy of these values. Any staging, 
even strictly utilitarian, of these values contributes to increase this efficacy and to force the 
respect of those who believe in them only partly. 
We have henceforth good reasons to think that opportunist promoters and users of the 
scandal act in this way, not because they have no other choice due to the political regime‟s 
nature, but mainly because the use of this repertoire of action directly proceeds from the 
reasons of their engagement in politics and from the analysis they make of the “public‟s” 
expectations. In that sense, they would do the same in a democratic context, since their 
motivation is moral and not strategic and since, when it proves strategic, it is grounded on the 
fact that they believe a minima that others have moral values and that they value their respect 
by the rulers. Thus, the moral repertoire is not initially selected because it allows doing 
politics indirectly in a context which does not permit it; it is foremost chosen for itself and 
indissociably for what it represents for the people. Nevertheless, it seems to fit the context, 
meaning that the rulers can hardly censor any public expression founded on it, because they 
cannot retract from values they proclaim themselves and because they believe, like their 
opponents and probably for the same reasons, that these values are largely shared. That the 
regime authorizes the expression of one type of values while censoring another does not 
implicate logically that the former was chosen ex ante because of this specificity. However, 
the evidence of its efficacy can further encourage ex post political actors to use it. Strategy is 
here the heir of morals. 
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